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SYMPOSIUM: THE FUTURE OF LAW AND
DEVELOPMENT, PART I
THE FUTURE OF LAW AND DEVELOPMENT
Tom Ginsburg*
Welcome to the Law and Development blog symposium! We are
thrilled to have a fantastic array of participants lined up and trust that the
discussion will be lively. In our call for participation, we asked people to
reflect on the diverse conceptions of ―law and development‖ and to take the
opportunity to think about the directions the field is headed. I would like to
begin by posing three questions for consideration, though I anticipate that
we may end up heading in quite different directions as well.
First, as an initial question, is Law and Development really a field? In
a recent paper, Brian Tamanaha argues that Law and Development is ―a
poorly constructed category that lacks internal coherence . . . . Law and development work is better seen, instead, as an agglomeration of projects perpetuated by motivated actors supported by funding.‖1 Much depends, of
course, on what we mean by a field. As a field of applied activity, Law and
Development seems to have a clear boundary involving reform projects related to legal institutions. As a scholarly field, however, it may be less
clear. On the one hand, we have two nascent journals, the Law and Development Review and the Hague Journal on the Rule of Law, which is surely
one sign of the institutionalization of a scholarly field. On the other hand,
one might argue that there is sufficient lack of consensus on method and
topic to deserve the title ―field.‖ But if not a field, what is it?
Second, what, if anything, have we already learned about the topic? It
is canonical in discussing Law and Development to hearken back to the first
(or second, depending how you count) law and development movement of
the 1960s and 1970s. It is also canonical to point out that we are now seeing activity on a much larger scale than ever before, with perhaps billions of
dollars spent in aggregate on projects touching the area each year. Many articles in the field today essentially repeat Trubek and Galanter’s 1970s cri-
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tique of the misconceptions of all this work.2 But we surely have developed
more sophisticated tools for understanding development outcomes since the
1960s, even if many of these tools (particularly cross-country measures of
institutional quality) are highly contested. What do we know that we did
not know ten years ago? What is the best Law and Development research?
Perhaps one way of framing the latter question is to ask: if you had to suggest that someone outside Law and Development read only two or three recent articles, what would they be?
Third, where should our attention go in the future? Are some scholarly
and practical approaches more or less promising? Some institutions more
or less deserving of study and/or reform? Surely there are lively debates
over what constitute best practices, the design of development assistance,
how to measure the rule of law, and the very possibility of institutional
change. The tent does not seem to be folding, notwithstanding many concerns about the relationship between legal reform and development outcomes.
I’ve asked more questions than can be answered. Let’s see what our
bloggers have to say.

2
See David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the
Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 WIS. L. REV. 1062 (describing conceptual and practical failures of the Law and Development movement).
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THE ALCHEMY OF LAW AND DEVELOPMENT
Salil Mehra*
At the heart of Law and Development currently sits a dilemma stemming from the relationship between activity and study. Tom Ginsburg has
kicked off this discussion with three questions that helpfully frame this
problem.
To his three questions, I would add a fourth. Specifically, how does
the relationship between Law and Development and the alphabet soup of
rule-of-law promoting organizations (IMF, WTO, ICN, OECD, World
Bank), to which Ginsburg and Brian Tamanaha3 point, provide benefits to
Law and Development as an academic enterprise? That Law and Development is disproportionately a collection of sponsored projects—a critique
that could be aimed to some degree at other fields also—should not prevent
us from asking how Law and Development’s interaction with these international organizations imposes an externally driven logic.
The costs of this relationship, on the other hand, are well-known to the
participants in this symposium. Of particular detriment is the tendency for
Law and Development scholars to focus on issues that would make for replicable ―tools‖ and ―best practices‖ that could be readily transplanted. For
example, the empirically driven attraction of Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny (―LLSV‖) to the
IMF and World Bank,4 and the resulting focus of the field on their ―law
matters‖ thesis, suggests how Law and Development can be consumed by
the search for a development Philosopher’s Stone that will lead to the completion of a new millennium Great Work.
We can observe another example of this tendency in competition law,
particularly in the work of the International Competition Network (ICN),
which focuses on competition advocacy.5 This group does a great job of gathering information about the differing abilities and approaches of national
competition enforcement agencies in order to provide competition-based
critiques of government policy and to enlist civil society in constructing a
competition culture in their nations. But the ICN is, at times, inordinately
*
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See, e.g., Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997)
(link); Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998) (link); Rafael La Porta et
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See Daniel Sokol, Monopolists Without Borders: The Institutional Challenge of International Antitrust in a Global Gilded Age, 4 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 37, 105–116 (2007).

http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/37/:aw.nort 166

NO RT HW E ST ER N U NI VE RSI T Y LAW RE VIE W C O LL OQ UY

focused on building a toolkit of best practices—something that may not be
appropriate when the contexts in which these agencies are embedded often
differ substantially from one another. A really great hammer (though it
might work, despite some damage) is not so great when faced with a screw.
There is a real risk that the academic field of Law and Development can become similarly obsessed with what comparativists might call applied functionalism.
I think that there is a way forward for Law and Development that involves embracing and addressing differences rather than seeking a universal
solvent. By taking this path, Law and Development’s close link with its
sponsors can prove to be a benefit. Recently, I had the fortune to hear Eleanor Fox speak. She discussed ways we might think about the differences in
context and in endowments that different competition agencies find themselves with, and pointed out that it can be useful to simply understand and
appreciate these differences in order to better manage conflicts with each
other and with other institutions.6 In a similar vein, Lan Cao has written
about the need for Law and Development to address embedded cultural
practices and institutions, rather than taking them as a given, as tends to
happen now.7 Together, Fox’s and Cao’s views provide a path whereby
Law and Development, rather than focusing on universal tools that may be
stymied by varying cultures and institutions, can try to build models and
endorse practices that embrace these differences. These differences can
then either be accounted for in the translation of ―best practices‖ or be made
themselves into objects of development reform. That is, at least, one vision
for the future of Law and Development, though perhaps it is an ambitious
one.

6
See ABA Section on Antitrust, Panel Discussion: The International Competition Network, Moving
Forward with a New Chair and New Challenges (Jul. 1, 2009), available at
http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-bb/audio/09/AT90701.mp3 (link).
7
See Lan Cao, Culture Change, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 357 (2007) (link).
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THERE IS NO SINGLE FIELD OF LAW AND DEVELOPMENT
Katharina Pistor*
Let me begin—following Ohnesorge8 following Trubek and Santos9—
with the notion that the concepts of ―law and development‖ and ―rule of
law‖ are closely intermingled with the process of legal reform in developing
countries and the role foreign advisers and multilateral institutions play in
that undertaking. Describing the ―field‖ in this fashion reveals that the glue
that holds together a set of disparate activities by disparate actors (for under
what other circumstances do we assume common ground between family
and securities lawyers, or professors and world bankers?) is a shared belief
in the virtue of law.
The beauty of the ―law and development‖ ideal and the ―rule of law‖
ideal is that hardly anybody can disagree with the goal of building a neutral
and universally accessible institutional framework that is meant to benefit
all people irrespective of race, gender, social status, or membership in a particular clan or group. This unity of purpose also means that academics and
policy advisers across the political spectrum can join forces. When resources are constrained, we do not have to discuss whether political reforms
should precede economic reforms, whether land reform supersedes investments in infrastructure, or whether educational or health reforms should
take precedence over building stock markets or establishing antitrust agencies. Instead, we can all promote legal development reforms based on the
assumption that building a sound legal system will ultimately further all of
the above. Studies indicating a strong correlation between the ―rule of law‖
and economic growth appear to buttress that assumption.10
Obviously, however, correlations do not prove causation. And it is
disconcerting that we lack a sound theoretical basis for explaining why the
correlation between legal development and economic growth holds across
some countries, but breaks down in others. Nor do we have a good handle
on why legal reforms frequently fail to deliver the expected results and,
sometimes, correlate to events the opposite of those anticipated.11 In short,
*
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THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006).
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See, e.g., Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, Institutions and Economic Performance: CrossCountry Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures, 7 ECON. & POL. 207 (1995); Daniel Kaufmann
et al., Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996–2004 (World Bank Policy Research
Working Paper No. 3630, 2005) (link).
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For a general critique of the lack of theory and empirics in the field of Law and Development, see
Trubek & Galanter, supra note 2. On the failure of wholesale law reform projects to enhance the levels
of rule of law in transplant countries, see Daniel Berkowitz et al., The Transplant Effect, 51 AM. J.
COMP. L. 163 (2003).
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we continue to know very little about the political economy of legal reforms
and their distributional effects. If we believe strongly enough that good law
creates a win-win situation whereby today’s losers will tomorrow happily
join today’s winners without dethroning them, we need not bother. But beliefs do not add up to an academic field—and for good reason.
Take, for example, the relation between the ―rule of law‖ and the status
of women in society. The status of women in society can serve as a heuristic device. Women represent the systematically disenfranchised: they can be
found in all societies, and all societies tend to discriminate against women,
or at least share a legacy of discriminating against them.12 On their face, the
ideals that underpin legal reform efforts13 suggest that women should benefit from the rule of law as an alternative to entrenched social norms. Yet
closer inspection reveals that in most parts of the world there is at best a
weak correlation between the status of women in society and the ―rule of
law,‖ notwithstanding comprehensive law reform efforts to advance their
rights.14
But this example may not prove much. Indeed, one might argue that,
with some patience, law will eventually benefit women in countries around
the globe. However, unless we have a sound theory that suggests under
what conditions women actually do gain from specific legal reforms and in
what ways, this strategy condemns us to an ―invisible hand‖15 approach.
Just as advocates of free markets assume that market forces will ultimately achieve the most efficient outcome, so too advocates of rule of law
reforms assume that they will ultimately serve the best outcome. Yet neither markets nor legal rules are ends in themselves—ultimately, both serve
broader social goals. Only with a clearer understanding of what these ends
ought to be can we begin to disentangle the relation between specific legal
reform efforts and the social and economic indicators used to assess and
measure the legal reform effort. And it is only with better goal identification that we can begin to appreciate alternatives to law that may achieve
similar social and economic outcomes, the acknowledgement of which
brings us squarely back to the Critical Legal Studies debates of the 1970s.
12

According to the Gender Gap index, even a country like Sweden discriminates against women.
See Katharina Pistor et al., Social Norms, Rule of Law, and Gender Reality: An Essay on the Limits of
the Dominant Rule of Law Paradigm, in GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE RULE OF LAW 241–278 (James
J. Heckmann et al. eds., 2009).
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Most central is the ideal of ―the rule of law.‖ For a critical review of this concept as a foundation
for data collection efforts, see Melissa Thomas, What Do the Worldwide Governance Indicators Measure?,
EUR.
J.
DEV.
RES.
(2009),
http://www.palgravejournals.com/ejdr/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/ejdr200932a.html (link). Another crucial ideal is ―freedom.‖ See AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999). However, Nussbaum makes the important point that a general reference to freedom is not enough. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Capabilities
as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and Social Justice, 9 FEMINIST ECON. 33, 35 (2003). Instead, Nussbaum advocates a list of substantive freedoms. Id. at 40–42.
14
Pistor, supra note 12, Fig. 11.3, at 251.
15
ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS: BOOKS IV–V 32 (Penguin Books 1999) (1776).
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Accordingly, perhaps it is time to concede that there is no single field of
Law and Development. Instead, there are multiple disciplines that share a
common interest in the comparative development of (legal) institutions in
societies at different income levels.
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LAW & DEVELOPMENT NARROW AND LAW & DEVELOPMENT BROAD
Anna Gelpern*
I confess an embarrassing aversion to existence debates, one likely
born of slogging through too many first chapters of International Law textbooks (―Is It Law?‖) and straining hard to care. If we argue long enough
about whether Law and Development is a field, a subfield, a project, or a
collection of projects, it will surely become field-ish enough soon enough.
And Brian Tamanaha has done as much as anyone to shape the field, such
as it might be, beginning with his marvelous early work on legal transplants
in Micronesia.16 Thus I am all for marching forward on the assumption that
there is or soon will be a field of Law and Development, and focusing on
Tom’s second and third questions, which go to what we want this field to
look like.
The day’s financial upheaval offers a fine opportunity to rethink what
Law and Development should be. I suggest two options, Law and Development Narrow, and Law and Development Broad.
Law and Development Narrow would continue refining our knowledge
of the relationship between law and economic growth in the applied Law
and Economics vein (more context sensitivity, more/better empirical studies), and broadening our view of the law’s role in human development
(better incorporating ―the social‖17). It would also press on with the sociology/ethnography/political economy of legal technical assistance, including
institutional studies.
Law and Development Narrow has the virtue of definability, and the
foundation of history, doctrine, and critique, from Trubek & Galanter18 to
Trubek & Santos.19 But it can become self-limiting. At worst, it will be the
study of legal technical assistance, the inoffensive ninth ―deliverable‖ at
every international summit, thrice outsourced to and by bilateral develop*
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ment agencies and multilateral development banks. Since we, law professors from the erstwhile center, ultimately get the consultancy, it might look
important—but does anyone outsource the nukes, exchange rates, or structural adjustment? Even in the more ―holistic‖ vision of Law and Development Narrow, we are the legal department to development economists
(assume the most respectable, say Stiglitz and Sen20), and marginal critics to
Jim Wolfensohn’s Comprehensive Development Framework.21 Law and
Development Narrow toils nobly in the institutional trenches, glad at the incremental improvement it might prod in the human condition—but can we
reach farther, particularly as an (ahem) academic field?
Law and Development Broad is disturbingly amorphous. It takes from
the Law and Development work done so far a rare and valuable perspective,
a view of the relationship between law and economics from what was until
recently the political and economic periphery. It takes the empiricism inherent in legal reform projects, the trove of qualitative and quantitative studies
of legal transplants, the theories of legal pluralism, and the politics of postcolonial law reform. And, like Trubek & Santos, it takes the institutional
studies, but it does not use a brand of existing development institutions to
delimit the field.
Law and Development Broad is perfectly placed to respond to the latest cataclysm of financial integration, whose epicenter happens to be in
New York and London, precisely because it saw it all before in Manila,
Moscow, Lagos, and Buenos Aires. The past year has brought a slew of
Egg-on-Our-Faces reports from the traditional providers of legal technical
assistance, a parade of Regulators-in-Self-Estrangement confessionals.22
Turns out our own law and development were not all they could be. But
20
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5
(2009),
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because financial integration is real, ―our‖ law has an immediate and dramatic impact on ―their‖ development, and, increasingly, vice versa.23 This
observation is not new, but feels much more obvious today than it did even
a few years ago.24 We cannot apologize and pack up; we need ―them‖ to
keep buying Treasury bills. The unequivocal directionality that defined
Law and Development, which Brian highlights in his latest essay,25 fits
awkwardly with the ascendance of the G20, BRIC summitry, global imbalances, and, as John points out in his blog post, the could-be Beijing Consensus (will Beijing want a consensus in its name?).26
Law and Development Broad, then, is in a privileged position relative
to many more established fields to tell the complicated story of law and integration, law and interpenetration, law and plural, multilevel, relational
governance. It knows of power, of institutions, and of practice far beyond
funded law reform. It has been through public and private, and is not easily
bewitched by either. It is intensely self-aware, but has moved past navelcontemplation. And it knows that bringing together law and human development, richly defined, demands untold amounts of humility, personal and
intellectual commitment for the long haul. I could live with such a field—
or call it what you will.

23
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